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THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY 
HARVEY FRANK* 
Public corporations today are more than businesses. They are mini-
ature governmentsl which even more than in the past influence the 
social, political and economic fabric of American life.2 And their in-
fluence goes beyond the nation's borders to intrude into the foreign 
policy of the United States.3 In other words, the problem of the status 
of corporations goes beyond the familiar but still unresolved question 
of the separation of managerial control from the economic interest of 
shareholders.4 A fundamental question is raised about the place of 
public corporations in the American political and economic super-
structure. A public corporation must operate within the law but other-
wise need be responsive to no one, neither to the government, to the 
public at large, nor normally in practice to its own shareholders. It 
is a private government in a public sphere whose citizens have only 
the shadow of a vote.S 
May a corporation with a large concentration of wealth and economic 
*Currently a Professor of Law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia; formerly a partner, specializing in 
corporate Jaw, with the New York City law firm of Schwartz, Burns, Lesser and 
Jacoby; LL.M. in tax law, New York University Law School; J.D., Harvard 
Law School; A.B., New York University. 
lTwo examples will illustrate the scope of these pseudo governments. In 1973, 
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. had consolidated sales and revenues 
of $23.5 billion and 1,023,000 employees, MooJ>v's PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL 991 
(1974), and Gen. Motors Corp. had consolidated sales and revenues of $35.8 billion 
and 810,000 employees, 1 MooJ>Y's INJ>USTRIAL MANUAL 1066 (1974). By contrast, 
the 1973 gross national product of a sampling of several moderate sized European 
nations was: Finland, $16.5 billion; Greece, $16.4 billion; Norway, $18 billion; 
Portugal, $10 billion; and Switzerland, $42 billion. The 1970 gross national product 
of the continent of Africa was $59.7 billion, while tile combined 1973 sales and 
revenues of GM and A.T.&T. was $59.3 billion. U.S. BuREAu OF CENSUS, STATIS-
TICAL ABsTRACT oF TH~ UNITltJ> STATES 824, 825 (95th ed. 1974). 
2This is axiomatic. A few notorious illustrations outside the econolnic sphere 
include the problems of employment discrimination by race and sex, the environ-
mental impact from industrial pollution to strip mining, the direct and indirect 
political contributions by corporations to campaigns and the molding of consumer 
taste. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S. Ct. 814, 12 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1963) 
(Douglas, J., concurring opinion and appendix 1 thereto). 
3 A few current illustrations would be the alleged interference of International 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. with elections in Chile, the actions of oil 
companies in the Middle East, mutual landing .rights of United States and foreign 
airlines, and arms shipments and the sale (or r~usal to sell) sophisticated tech-
nological information to the Soviet Union. Historical examples would include the 
founding of Jamestown by the Virginia Company, and the colonization of parts of 
Asia by the East India Company. 
4See T. VEBLEN, ABSE~ OwNERSHIP 215, 216 (1923); and A. BltRLE & G. 
MEANS, THE MoJ>ERN CoRPORATION ANJ> PruvAn PROPERTY 7 (rev.· ed. 1967). 
SSee Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 404 U.S. 403, 92 S. Ct. 577, 
30 L. Ed. Zd 560 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting opinion). 
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power and concomitant social and political power properly exist in a 
democracy without being subject to political control through a democratic 
political process, and if it does so, can that democracy long endure? 
Certainly there are grave risks although some commentators are less 
alarmed than others.6 However, the major problem has not been one 
of principle but one of practice. Corporations do present the form of 
democracy, but not the substance, thus camouflaging the underlying 
reality. This article, after examining the scope of the present situation, 
shall make a modest proposal to modify the form in order to effectuate 
substantive corporate democracy. 
I. CoRPORATE DEMOCRACY-THE MYTH AND THE REALITY 
First, let us explore the extent of corporate democracy in America, 
both the myth and the reality. The examination shall be limited to 
corporate democracy in shareholder elections but shall exclude refer-
endum elections such as approval of mergers, sale of assets and the like. 
Not that such matters are unimportant, but they raise a different and 
less fundamental set of problems and are worthy of separate treatment. 
The election of directors by a vote of the shareholders is a natural 
out-growth of the concept of a business corporation and is the required 
procedure in every state. This philosophy was accepted by Congress7 
in enacting the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,8 and some aspects of corporate elections are stricter than political 
elections.9 Yet, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(herein the "Commission") dealt mainly with procedure, to insure an 
honest election and a reasonably informed electorate. The substantive 
rights adhering to a shareholder's franchise were described by the law 
of the several states. 
Public corporations appear to represent an economic extension of 
American political democracy. More than thirty million Americans 
owned shares in public companies in 1970 with an aggregate estimated 
market value of 682 billon dollars, and a substantial number of additional 
Americans had an indirect interest in publicly held stock estimated at 
365 billion dollars, held by intermediate fiduciary institutions such as 
pension trust funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies.10 
6See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971) ; Chayes, The 
Modern Corporation and ~he Rule of Law, in THE CoRPORATION IN MoDERN SociETY 
25, 40 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
7H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1934). 
8Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). 
9SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956). 
IONEw YoRK SrocK ExcHANGE, CENsus OF SHAREOWNERSHIP 1, 24 (1970). 
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The forms of corporate democracy are familiar. 11 Each year in 
advance of the annual meeting of shareholders, an annual report on 
slick paper containing pictures and looking for all the world like an 
expensive magazine is mailed to shareholders, as well as a simple black 
and white proxy statement printed on plain lightweight bond paper.t2 A 
few corporations include pictures of nominees in the proxy staten1ent. 
More include pictures of existing directors in the annual report where 
they can be better balanced by pictorial endorsements of the company's 
product. A proxy form and a postage paid return envelope are 
enclosed so that a shareholder who does not attend the meeting may 
vote for the nominees of the existing management, and while his vote 
will have no influence on the result, it may be useful in establishing 
a quorum. At the meeting, if he attends, he will hopefully receive an 
optimistic report by the company president. If he is fortunate he may 
even hear some penetrating questions by fellow shareholders which may 
or may not be answered from the podium. Many companies put out 
post-meeting reports which summarize the discussions and questions 
at the meeting for those who do not attend. A new trend is to have 
an informal information meeting before or after the shareholders meet-
ing with the two-fold purpose of allowing more time for officers' reports 
and shareholders' questions and minimizing stockholder participation 
at the formal meeting. Bond-holders and holders of debentures, even 
convertible debentures, cannot vote and may not even be entitled to 
notice of the meeting. They have an economic interest in the corpora-
tion, but only the shareholder can vote. Only the shareholder is a 
citizen of the corporation.t3 All this has the appearance of democracy 
except that voting is on a per share not a per capita basis. There 
appears to be majority rule, but is there? The question requires a brief 
look at corporate democracy in action. 
llThey elaborate on a pattern prescribed by SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240 
(1974) and state law. The discussion in this article is limited to corporations which 
by reason of § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U!S.C. § 78 (1970) 
have common stock subject to the proxy rule. Although proxy solicitation is not 
required by either state or federal law (though once undertaken it must comply 
with the appropriate requirements referenced in the preceding sentence) , the New 
York Stock Exchange Listing Agreement § III 1f 5 and the American Stock Ex-
change Listing Agreement § 6b require corporations with stock listed on such 
exchanges to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders. See also NEW YoRK 
SrocK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL A-29, A-34 and AMERICAN SrocK Ex-
CHANGE CoMPANY Gumt 299, 300 (1973). 
12SEC Proxy Rule 14a-3(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974) requires the company to 
supply additional copies of the annual report and proxy statement to brokerage 
houses and others who hold stocks of record for beneficial owners and pay the 
reasonable cost to distribute copies of this material to the beneficial owners. 
13A few state statutes now authorize corporations to grant voting rights in their 
charters to holders of debt securities, e.g., 8 Da. CoDE§ 221 (1953) and CAL. CoRP. 
CoDE § 306 (1947). Such debt instruments are quite rare in public corporations. 
Their existence would expand the concept of a corporate citizen, 
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How is a shareholder's election for directors conducted? Some weeks 
before the annual meeting of shareholders a slate of nominees is selected 
by the existing board of directors.I4 To almost no one's surprise, nearly 
all of the nominees are existing directors.1S They may be officers of 
the company, corporate counsel, bankers or investment bankers to the 
company, substantial stockholders, and may also include several un-
affiliated persons presumably friendly to management.16 
Many boards consist of directors who, even in the aggregate, own 
a very small portion of the outstanding stock of the company and that 
often acquired by stock options. In fact, generally speaking, the larger the 
corporation, the smaller the direct stock ownership that is represented on 
the board. For example, in 1975, the nominees for director of American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. and their families owned in the 
aggregate 21,856 shares of common stock of 560,940,041 shares out-
standing,17 or 0.0039 percent of the outstanding shares. Other examples 
selected at random show that nominees for director owned in the 
aggregate the following percentages of outstanding common stock: 
0.051 percent in Exxon Corp., 0.094 percent in U.S. Steel, and 
0.302 percent in Caterpillar Tractor.ts The list could go on. Moreover, 
a large number of the shares held by officer-directors were apparently 
purchased through key employee stock option plans or similar plans 
pursuant to which shares were purchased at an advantageous price. 
This is not a new phenomenon and continues the trend predicted by 
Professor Berle a generation ago.l9 
These directors have no constituency, yet they serve unchallenged 
on their boards year after year, in good times and in bad. 20 There 
is no way to compel a shareholder's nominee to be included in the 
14See M. MACE, DIREcToRs: MYTH AND REALITY 195 (1971). 
lSFor example, a random sampling of twenty public corporations shows that only 
fourteen directors of an aggregate of 304 directors failed to be re-elected. If 
directors who were not renominated for reasons of death or retirement (as stated 
in the company's annual report to stockholders) are eliminated, only five directors 
failed to be re-elected and not more than two directors in any company. A random 
two-year consecutive period between 1969 and 1975 was selected for each corpora-
tion as the basis for comparison. 
16J. BACON, CoRPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES table 6 at 29 (1973). A distinct 
majority of the companies surveyed in this study had boards consisting of a ma-
jority of outside (but presumably affiliated or friendly) directors, id., at 2. 
I7See the 1975 Proxy Statement of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. for 
the 1975 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. 
18See the 1975 Proxy Statements of Exxon Corp., United States Steel Corp. and 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., respectively, for their 1975 annual meetings of shareholders. 
19Berle and Means, note 4, supra, at 66. 
20Six of the companies in the survey described in note 15, supra, had an adverse 
financial report (compared to the prior year) for the fiscal year immediately pre-
ceeding the election; of these six companies only three of an aggregate of ninety-
six directors failed of re-election, two of whom were directors in one corporation 
with a twelve-man board. 
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management proxy, although management may recognize a substantial 
stock position with a place on the board. Shareholders may vote for 
management's nominees listed on the proxy but cannot use that proxy 
to vote for other candidates. 21 Except by assuming all the expenses 
connected with a proxy fight, there is no practical way to solicit proxies 
for a dissident slate or a minority director. The obstacle is not legal 
(except in those states where a stockholder cannot get a shareholders 
list sufficiently in advance of the meeting22), but one of cost.23 At a 
minimum there is the cost of preparing, filing and processing a proxy 
statement through the Commission, printing and mailing the proxy 
statement, as well as the associated legal expenses.24 To this should be 
added soliciting expenses, possible newspaper advertisements, prepaid 
return postage and the problem of securing a shareholders list (which 
frequently requires litigation). Unless control of the board is secured, 
even a successful candidate might have to repeat this procedure every 
year. Opposition nominations can be made and votes can be cast in 
person at the meeting for such non-management nominees but since 
almost all votes are cast by proxy before the meeting and few, if any, 
shareholders vote in person, it is an empty right. The right to solicit 
proxies is the right to elect. 
Unless there is an election contest, brokerage firms which own stock 
in street name are permitted by the New York and American Stock 
Exchange rules to cast proxies for the election of management's 
nominees. 25 This enables management to readily secure a quorum. On 
the other hand, if there is an opposing slate the brokerage house must 
solicit instructions from the beneficial owners of securities (at the 
company's or soliciting parties' expense, as the case may be). Brokerage 
firms may not vote their own wishes except for securities of which they 
are beneficial as well as record owners.26 The information furnished 
to shareholders in the proxy statement generally consists of a nominee's 
21An examination of the form of proxy of several hundred companies indicates 
this to be the universal practice. The management proxy form for the 1975 annual 
meeting of the shareholders of the Proctor and Gamble Co., in what may be a 
singular example, allows shareholders to vote for some nominees and withhold 
their votes from others. 
22The shareholders list is useful for personal solicitation but may not be essential 
if time is not of the essence and the insurgents can contest the election exclusively 
by mail and advertisements. See SEC Proxy Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1956). 
23See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 
1489, 15~01 (1970). 
24Compliance with SEC Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968) is required. 
25Rules 450-60 of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 2 CCH NEw 
YoRK SrocK EXCHANGE GuiDE §§ 2450-60 and Rules 575-85 of the Rules of the 
American Stock Exchange, 2 CCH AMERICAN SrocK ExcHANGE GUIDE§§ 9526-37. 
These rules apply to securities held by men1ber firms of the exchanges regardless 
of whether a stock is listed on the exchange. 
26Jd. 
44 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
principal occupation (and if he is being elected by shareholders for 
the first time, his principal occupation for the past five years), his 
ownership of equity securities of the company and of securities of any 
class of which he and his associates own ten percent, the compensation 
of any directors or nominees who received more than $40,000 a year, 
and certain transactions between the company and its directors or 
nominees since the beginning of the company's last full fiscal year.27 
There is no statement reflecting a nominee's position on any matters 
concerning the company, from dividend policy to plant expansion, from 
ecology to diversification to doing business with Russia. Finally, it is 
the company, not the nominee, which pays the cost of management 
solicitation. 
There can be, and in rare instances still are, proxy fights. When one 
group of investors decides that it would like to replace the manage-
ment with its own nominees and has accumulated enough shares to 
make an effective challenge, it must, if it wishes to solicit proxies, file 
its own proxy statement with the Commission28 and solicit proxies 
from the shareholders at its own expense. If the challengers win they 
can sometimes be reimbursed by the company.29 Win or lose, the 
company will normally bear management's costs.30 Usually, it is a 
"winner takes all" contest; i.e., one entire slate or another is elected. 
Occasionally a single seat on a board of a corporation with cumulative 
voting will be contested. These fights can be prohibitively expensive 
and are not undertaken except in unusual circumstances. The larger the 
company, the less the likelihood there is of a proxy fight. 31 As a result, 
tender offers appear to have become the preferred "take over" tech-
nique.32 
An examination of files of the New York Stock Exchange disclosed 
that during the twenty-one month period beginning January 1, 1972 
and ending September 30, 1973, there were only five companies which 
had proxy fights for the election of directors among the approximately 
1,500 companies listed on the Exchange.33 One of these corporations 
(with cumulative voting) had two contests in this period by the same 
27SEC Proxy Rule 14a-101, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (schedule A) (1974). 
28SEC Proxy Rule 14a-ll, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968). 
29Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 
291 (1955); L. Loss, SECURITIIts REGULATION 857 (2d ed. 1961). 
30[d. 
31Fleisher & Mundheim,Corporate Acquisition By Tender Offer, in SELECTED 
ARTICLES ON FED:eRAL SECURITIIts LAw 815, 818-19 (H. Wander & W. Grienen-
berger eds. 1968). Some examples of the costs of proxy fights are set forth in 
the footnotes to Eisenberg, note 23, supra. 
32Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 767 (1971). 
33This period included two annual meetings of shareholders for the election of 
directors for most of the companies surveyed. 
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insurgent for one seat on the board, but not for control. In a country 
where a local schoolboard cannot be elected without a contest, these 
statistics clearly suggest that corporate democracy is moribund if not 
extinct. 
The situation in most corporations may be analogized to a one-party 
government whose citizens may vote for management, or not vote at 
all. The corporations are often controlled by men who are more con-
cerned with their jobs and the company qua company than with a power-
less electorate. The "government" may no longer even feel compelled to 
maximize earnings, but only to avoid loss and its destructive effect on 
the technostructure34 and their security.35 
What is missing? The opportunity to dissent. The opportunity for 
shareholders who are not part of management to be represented on the 
board or at least a chance to appear on the ballot. A program to 
establish meaningful shareholder democracy is outlined in part III of 
this article. However, the scope of the problem is even broader because 
an estimated twenty-eight percent of all stock shares are held by mutual 
funds, banks, pension plans, universities, nominees and the like.36 
These shares are routinely voted for management. The governing 
philosophy appears to be that if one is unhappy with management, then 
he should sell ; otherwise vote for the incumbents. 37 Of course, as has 
been noted, this discussion is more often than not a theoretical one, 
since alternative slates are rare. To have meaningful,· functioning 
democratic capitalism, a way of giving impact to the indirect votes of 
the beneficial owners of these interests must be found. 
II. NoN-TRADITIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
It has been assumed thus far that corporate democracy is a necessary 
economic manifestation of a political democracy-that capitalism in a 
democracy should mean democratic capitalism or else political democ-
racy itself will be endangered. There are nevertheless several possible 
alternatives to traditional corporate democracy, not all of which are 
democratic, not all of which are capitalistic. 
Eliminate the Election of Directors 
The first possibility would be to carry the present system to its 
34See text at note 40, infra. 
35Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 168-169. 
36The stock referred to includes both common and preferred issues. Note 10, 
supra, at 24. 
37Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 12, Z6 (1962); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management 
in Modem Corporate Decision-making, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 49 (1969). 
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logical conclusion and eliminate all annual meetings for the election of 
directors. An annual report to shareholders and a statement in lieu 
of a proxy statement would presumably still be required as it is now 
for companies whose managements do not solicit proxies.38 However, 
shareholders would recognize that they were not corporate citizens of a 
democracy so much as investors in an autocracy.39 Some money might 
even be saved. Shareholders owning at least ten percent of the out-
standing voting stock could be allowed to demand that an annual 
meeting for the election of directors be held to allow for the violent 
eruption of a proxy fight. Such suggestions lead in turn to manage-
rialism. Or to put it another way, managerialism now exists in fact if 
not in form and the election of directors has been all but eliminated in 
fact if not in form. 
M anagerialism40 
In a large and complex corporation, not only are the stockholders 
without power but as Professor Galbraith has observed, " ... the Board 
of Directors is normally the passive instrument of the management."41 
The entrepreneur has been replaced by management42-by the some-
what larger number of individuals who bring specialized knowledge, 
talent or experience to group decision making and who compose what 
Galbraith calls the technostructure. Moreover, "Given the deep 
dependence of the industrial system on the state and the nature of its 
motivational relationship to the state, i.e., its identification with public 
goals and the adaptation of these to its needs, the industrial system 
will not long be regarded as something apart from government. Rather 
it will be seen as part of a much larger complex which embraces both 
the individual system and the state,"43 one which is leading to the 
socialization of the mature corporation.44 It is "socialism" with two 
major distinctions. First, the allocation of capital, the investment risk 
of the venture and a return on the investment are basically (though not 
entirely) private rather than public; and secondly, the board of directors 
38SEC Proxy Rule 14c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974). 
39Cf, Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L. ]. 1477, 1485-88 (1958). 
40A summary of the general theories which might be classified as managerialism 
is contained in Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 20. This approach has been refined 
and modified by Professor Galbraith and this discussion is based on his analysis, 
Galbraith, note 6, supra. 
41Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 149. 
42/d., at 70. 
43/d., at 395. 
44/d., at 397. 
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(and through them the technostructure) has no responsibility to a body 
politic, be it shareholders or the government.45 
It would appear that the model of the technostructure is a good 
descriptive model of corporate power and decision making in a con-
temporary corporation. There is little doubt as to the ability of the 
industrial system to serve man's physical needs, but as Galbraith asks, 
is it consistent with his liberty ?46 Not, he replies, if we continue to 
believe that "the goals of the industrial system . . . are coordinate with 
life," but only if aesthetic goals are strongly asserted.47 And this would 
hopefully be accomplished because the demands of the industrial system 
in. contrast ~ith its economic antecedents are intellectually' demanding 
and will bring forth a technostructure which will reject the goals of the 
industrial system which has bred it.48 This is indeed a slender reed 
upon which to trust our freedom. That may be why, despite Plato, 
there are still poets in our Republic. A large public corporation or an 
industrial state is not an economic entity alone and the inherent political 
needs of freedom cannot be guarded solely by economic arrangements 
or wistful entreaties to the future character of man. Liberty and freedom 
are political rights and can best be enhanced as they have always been, 
by reliance on democratic political processes, if appropriate ones can be 
found. Only if that search fails should efforts be bent in another 
direction. 
Client-Group Participation 
Another suggestion which has been put forth is to allow client-groups 
of the corporation to participate in decision making. These would in-
clude employees, customers including consumers, and suppliers and 
distributors at the expense of or even to the exclusion of the share-
holders.49 Except in the case of employees, this would probably raise 
an insuperable task of selecting representatives as well as countless 
instances of conflict of interest. How would directors be allocated among 
the several groups, who would have a right to vote, and how many votes 
might they cast? In any event, if this is the desired result might it not be 
45Galbraith finds economic power under democratic socialism in the non-com-
munist world to also be lodged with the technostructure and removed from the 
reach of social (political) control but that public ownership may increase the ame-
nability of the public corporation to social goals. Id., at 98, 104. It is unclear 
whether political control of enterprises has disintegrated as far in the Soviet Union. 
Id., at 106-07. Certainly in theory it has not done so. E. LIBERMAN, EcoNOMIC 
METHODS AND THIS EFFECT!VtNESS OF PRODUC'l'ION 44 (1970). 
46Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 399. 
47Jd., at 401-2. 
48Jd. 
49Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 16. 
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better achieved by an ombudsman or direct state ownership? 
Employee representation is at least mechanically feasible since there 
is a well-defined group, usually with a union, and established voting 
procedures under the supervision of the National Labor Relations 
Board. This attempt at codetermination with employees has apparently 
worked reasonably well in Germany but may be peculiar to the conti-
nental climate.so Codeterminism is inconsistent with the American 
tradition of labor management relations and American commentators 
have been suspicious about its applicability or acceptability on these 
shores.s1 
Even if one accepts the principle of codeterminism there remains 
the question of how to select the shareholders' representatives to the 
board, so at best and a doubtful best at that, codeterminism will com-
plicate the problem of democracy, but will not solve it.52 
Ombudsman 
Would the creation of an ombudsman at the state or federal level 
promote corporate democracy? It is certainly an alternative to client-
group participation and the government might appoint separate ombuds-
men as watchdogs for labor's rights, consumers' rights, etc. An 
ombudsman might attend and speak out, but not vote at directors' 
meetings. Many of these functions are now more or less allocated to 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Environmental Protection Agency, etc. The concept of 
giving the public at large or interest groups a voice in the direction 
of the corporation, considering the corporate influence on society, may 
have considerable merit. However, an ombudsman might appear to be 
more of a spy than a spokesman and there are already an abundance of 
regulatory agencies. 
Presidential Directors 
A more useful approach than an ombudsman and a variation of client-
group participation might be to authorize the President of the United 
States to appoint an ex officio member of the board at large for each 
public interest. This will not solve the problem of democratically elect-
ing directors but in its absence would give some political base to the 
board. However, the establishment of a representative corporate gov-
sosee Vagts, Reforming the Modem Corporatim~: Perspectives From the Ger-
man, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966-67) for an extended treatment of the German 
experience with codeterminism. 
Slid.; Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 20-21. 
52Cf. Vagts, note 50, supra., at 87-89. 
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ernment might by itself furnish a sufficient political body to obviate the 
need for this indirect representation of the public. It would be a sup-
plemental not a basic reform. However, if electoral reforms are not 
instituted, such an appointee system might prove a worthy experiment 
before the ultimate political alternative of socialism. 
The Government as the Sole Stockholder 
The Government is already an equal economic partner with the 
shareholders through taking fifty percent of the profits by way of taxes. 
The Government is often a direct or indirect source of business,53 and 
by means of the investment credit, tax depreciation and depletion allow-
ance, an indirect source of equity capital. The Government also greatly 
influences the cost and availability of credit. Then, of course, there is . 
the whole panoply of governmental standards and regulatory agencies, 
and in the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Government has completed 
the circle and is the sole owner. On the other hand, the communist 
countries of the Soviet bloc have been adopting capitalistic management 
techniques to the ordering of the productive and distributive aspects of 
their economy by decentralization, reliance on the market and the use 
of profit-based incentive systems. 54 Coming to a first flowering in 
Hungary, this approach has been expounded in the Soviet Union since 
the early 1960's by E. G. Liberman and others who have expostulated 
the essential role of commodity-monetary relations in the system of 
planned economic management, 5S and who have reached the further 
conclusion that the form of profit under socialism is similar to profit 
under capitalism.56 The tools of financial planning of both the Soviet 
centrally planned system and the divisional systems of large American 
corporations have become similar.57 In fact it has been suggested that 
Soviet enterprises should pay into the state budget out of their profits 
a certain percentage of the value of their assets as a payment for use of 
plant, i.e., a return on capital.58 However, under capitalism, Liberman 
asserts, profit is the goal of private enterprise while the goal in the 
Soviet Union is the satisfaction of the social and personal needs of the 
people. 59 The Soviet enterprise is in fact run by a technocracy not 
unlike the technostructure of American corporations except that instead 
of being theoretically responsible to its shareholders it is in fact polit-
53Sce Berte and Means, note 4, supra, at xvi; Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 395. 
54Tat LIBERMAN DiscussiON (M. Sharpe ed. 1966). 
SSLiberman, note 45, supra. 
S6Jd., at 57. 
S7B. HoRWITZ, AccouNTING CoNTROLS AND THE SoviET EcoNOMIC REFORMS OF 
1966 (1970). 
S8[d., at 23-36. See Liberman, note 45, s11pra, at 57. 
59Liberman, id. 
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ically responsible to the state through the Gosplan (State Planning 
Committee). 60 
Is there then a convergence or at least a converging of the economic 
systems of European Communism and American capitalism? With 
some reservations and still marked differences, the answer would appear 
to be in the affirmative, or at least that there is a serious mutual 
flirtation.61 Yet, even a casual observer of the social and political 
systems of the Soviet Union and the United States could not help but 
be struck by the marked and continuing differences. 
These are, then, clearly political not economic questions62 and there 
must be political solutions consistent with American democratic tradi-
tions. While totalitarian socialism would not be tolerable in this country, 
nations such as Great Britain and Sweden with traditions of democracy 
and freedom have opted for an increasing element of "democratic" 
socialism. But because of the size and· complexities of its economy, the 
Soviet Union may be the only comparable model. There is, then, the 
danger that if the economic circle is completed, the political circle may 
be completed. There is an equal danger that a powerful social and 
economic force in the country which has no political obligation may 
also lead to totalitarianism. 
III. A PROPOSAL TO FuRTHER CoRPORATE DEMOCRACY 
The search for or apology for non-democratic solutions for corporate 
democracy has been conducted perhaps not so much from a lack of faith 
in democracy as from despair as to how it might practically be achieved. 
The proposals set forth below apply a number of democratic institutional 
models to the corporate setting to further a concept of corporate 
democracy and furnish a political foundation for public corporations. 
Shareholders' Candidates 
The cornerstone of corporate democracy must be to allow share-
holders (as well as management) a reasonable opportunity to elect 
directors in faet as well as in theory. This includes the right to nomi-
nate a director to appear on the ballot, and th~ right to vote and have 
60Horwitz, note 57, StiJira, at 3-9; N. LUBINTSEV, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND Ex-
PERIENC¢ OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION 12-18 
(1965). ' 
61Liberman, Are We Flirting with Capitalism? in Sharpe, note 54, supra, at 304; 
Linnemann, Pronk & Tinbergen, Convergence of Economic Systems in East a11d 
West, in THE SoviET EcoNOMY 441 (3d ed., M. Bornstein & D. Fusfeld eds.); 
Wiles, Convergence: Possibility and Probability, in A. BALINSKI, A. BERGSON, J. 
HAZARD & P. WILES, PLANNING AND THE MARKET IN THE U.S.S.R.: THE 1960's 
(1970). 
62As Dr. Gardiner Means has observed, "[T]he real difference between the sys-
tem operating in Russia today and that in the United States is concerned with 
power and who makes what decisions." Berle & Means, note 4, supra, at xxxvii. 
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others vote for such nominee by proxy without undue effort or cost. 
Since management controls elections by control of the proxy machinery, 
this machinery must be opened equally to all shareholders. There must 
be the opportunity to nominate candidates to appear along with man-
agement's nominees in the company's proxy statement and on a single 
company ballot; furthermore, companies should be required to solicit 
proxies. 
There are undoubtedly many constructs which can be created to 
accomplish this objective. For purposes of this paper only a procedure 
suggested by the present provisions in the proxy rules for submitting 
proposals to meetings of security holders will be discussed.63 Under this 
method a nomination could be made by any shareholder by sending the 
name of his nominee, together with the candidate's consent to serve and 
the necessary background information required by the proxy rules, 64 
to the secretary of the corporation a reasonable time before the election 
is to be held.65 The candidate would have to be responsible for com-
plying with such rules and for the accuracy of the information furnished. 
If the company had any reservations about such accuracy or compliance 
its obligation would be limited to so advising the Commission. For 
practical purposes the number of such non-management nominees should 
be limited to certainly no more than the number of vacancies on the 
board and perhaps less. There is the danger that too many nominees 
might dilute the votes of insurgents thus dooming any attempt to have 
non-management representation on the board. Hence, a smaller number 
of nominees might be preferable. In fact, this proposal might find 
quicker acceptance in the business community if shareholder nominees 
were limited to one less than a majority of the board, thus not 
threatening incumbent management with a change in control. This 
requirement, as with most of the details of these procedures, should 
be within the rule-making authority of the Commission so that they 
can be modified with experience. If there are more nominees than 
places, those nominees having the greatest number of shares supporting 
their nomination petitions would be selected to appear in the proxy 
statement. A candidate would not be permitted to run for more than 
two consecutive years unless he received ten percent of the votes 
necessary to elect one director at the most recent meeting.66. A can-
63SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972). Section 14a-8(a) of this rule 
now specifically excludes any application to corporate elections. 
64See items 6 and 7 of schedule 14a, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974). 
65The nominating shareholder would presumably have to be a shareholder on the 
date of the nomination and the record date for the meeting. This procedure is 
consistent with state law (although the proposals may supercede certain by-laws). 
See Eisenberg, note 23, supra, at 1502. 
66See the section entitled Cumulative Voting, infra, at 54. 
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didate should be allowed to count the votes he received in the last 
election towards his qualification as a nominee. Rules governing the 
soliciting of support for nominating petitions might be required. 
The proxy statement should allow each of the nominees named in 
the proxy statement (management nominees and shareholders' nomi-
nees) to furnish a short (one hundred word) summary indicating 
among other things whether or not he agrees with management policies. 
Shareholders will then have something more than a director's principal 
occupation and share ownership on which to base a decision. Nominees, 
of course, would have to disclose if they have any direct or indirect 
affiliation with any competitor, supplier or customer, and nominees 
whose election to the board might be illegal because of the antitrust 
laws or otherwise could be omitted from the proxy statement, again 
under appropriate Commission rules or guidelines. The names of all 
nominees listed in the proxy statement should be included in the man-
agement proxy which would then be a company proxy. If there were 
more nominees than vacancies on the board, shareholders would vote 
for each of the directors they support. The proxy committee would be 
bound to vote in accordance with the proxy instructions in the same 
way proxies under the current rules follow such instructions in casting 
negative votes against a management-supported merger. 67 "Bullet" or 
slate voting would not be allowed as it would only encourage the one-
party system these proposals are designed to eliminate, and candidates' 
names should be listed in alphabetical order. Shares held in street name 
by brokerage houses would, as now, be voted on instructions from their 
beneficial owners when there is a contest.68 Companies listed on the 
major stock exchanges are required to solicit proxies for shareholder's 
meetings69 and even unlisted corporations which choose not to solicit 
proxies must furnish information to their shareholders comparable to 
that which would be included in a proxy statement.70 The cost of these 
proposals to the corporation and the effort necessary to implement them 
would be minimal, totaling little more than a small increase in printing 
charges from the addition of proxy material prepared by the candidates. 
The concept of shareholders' candidates will certainly be resisted by 
many who enjoy the status quo. Their position will likely focus on the 
argument that a board of directors should represent all the company's 
shareholders as a group, and the supposition that a minority director 
67SEC Proxy Rule 14a-4(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968). 
68Note 25, supra. 
69Listing Agreements of the New York Stock Exchange § III 11 5, NEw YoRK 
STOCK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL B-95, B-101 and American Stock Exchange 
§ 6b, AMERICAN SrocK ExcHANGE CoMPANY GuiDE 299, 300 (1973). 
70SEC Proxy Rule 14c-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1969). 
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will introduce dissent into an otherwise harmonious board. 71 Many 
boards go through a full year of meetings without a single dissenting 
• ote. An abstention (except because of a conflict of interest) is often 
c:Dnsidered to be the harshest of criticisms.72 If this situation could be 
... Ganged, boards with minority directors might cease being "the passive 
•. tstrument of management."73 A minority director owes the same 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders as do all other 
, • .irectors. He will at least have a true constituency among the share-
;,olders and his interest in their welfare will be inherently no less than 
....n inside director with job and compensation conflicts. But efficiency 
is always the oligarch's argument against democracy. The resolution 
must be based on political philosophy not economic pragmatism. 
The authority granted to the Commission by sections 14(a) and 
23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193474 appears sufficiently 
broad to permit the Commission to adopt implementing regulations. 
Over the years the contents of proxy statements and annual reports 
have had their scope expanded and companies' obligations under the 
rules enlarged so that management is now required to mail proxy 
statements and other communications for security holders,75 shareholders 
are allowed to submit proposals which must be included in the manage-
ment proxy statement,76 and an increasing quantity of public financial 
information is being made available to stockholders, particularly in the 
annual report to shareholders. 77 As late as 1966 shareholders who 
wished to vote at an annual meeting on any matter presented to share-
holders (other than the election of directors), for all practical purposes, 
also had to vote for management's nominees for directors. Today a 
stockholder may vote for a merger and abstain from voting for man-
agement's nominees.78 It would appear that the proposals put forth 
here could be adopted by the Commission within the authority granted 
to it to make rules with regard to the solicitation of proxies.79 
71Cf. Bacon, note 16, supra, at 9. 
72See Mace, note 14, supra, at 46-7, 54-5. This is true although many companies 
have boards with a majority of outside directors, see Bacon, id., at 2. However, 
their constituency is too often the board which selects them rather than the share-
holders who nominally elect them. 
73Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 149. 
7415 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964). 
7SSEC Proxy Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1956). 
76SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972). 
77SEC Proxy Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974). 
7SSEC Proxy Rule 14a-4(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968). 
79Note 63, supra. The last sentence of Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972) 
would have to be correspondingly deleted and its inclusion in the rule would appear 
to be an acknowledgement by the Commission that this area is within its rule-
making competence. 
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Cumulative Voting 
However, changes in the election procedure are only the beginning. 
For it must be assumed that management with the cooperation of 
institutional investors, will as it always has, still normally control a 
majority of the votes cast. An occasional minority director might be 
elected, but it would be the exception. Fifty-one perc~nt of a quorum 
at a stockholders' meeting would still typically elect one hundred percent 
of the board. Something more is needed. The traditional manner of 
assuring broad representation in the election of directors is by com-
pulsory cumulative voting. It has been relatively successful in private 
corporations but has not led to significant minority representation in 
public companies80 because alternative candidates are not listed in 
the proxy statement or on the proxy card. The proposed amendments 
to the proxy rules in the preceeding section would remedy that defect. 
The effectiveness of cumulative voting is further diminished by the 
practice of classifying directors.s1 A nine-man board might be divided 
into three classes of three directors each, elected for three-year terms. 
A minority will thus require many more votes to elect a director than 
if all nine seats were being filled at the same time, 82 thereby defeating 
the effect of cumulative voting. Twenty-one states have mandatory 
cumulative voting provisions.83 However, it is unlikely such provisions 
will )le generally adopted by the remaining states because of the 
competition among most states to enact liberal corporate codes in 
order to attract large companies as domestic corporations.84 Since 
Congress has moved to regulate corporate elections through the 1934 
Act, this proposal is a natural and necessary outgrowth of that legis-
lative scheme. Although cumulative voting has been governed by state 
law, it is a provision that concerns the state of incorporation little, if at 
80Bacon, note 16, supra, at 8. 
81See Wolfson v. Avery, 6 111.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955), which held a statute 
allowing classification of directors inconsistent with a State constitutional require-
ment of cumulative voting; contra, Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 
282, 128 A.Zd 76 (1956). 
82For example, if a corporation had cumulative voting, a board of nine directors, 
and 1,000,000 shares of voting stock represented at an annual meeting, then 
100,000 shares would be ·required to elect one director; if the board were divided 
into three classes of three directors each, then 250,000 shares would be required 
to elect one director. The New York Stock Exchange refuses to authorize the 
listing of stock where the board is divided into more than three classes. Nr."W YoRK 
STOCK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL § A15, at A-280. 
83As of 1972, seventeen states had mandatory provisions on cumulative voting, 
and four states had mandatory cumulative voting on request. Twenty-six states 
had permissive provisions and three states had no provision on cumulative voting. 
Bacon, note 16, supra, at 8. 
84Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections uPon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L. ]. 663 (1974). 
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all, with respect to a public corporation. Corporate elections in public 
companies are, as Congress has already determined,ss of national con-
cern. Such elections affect the interstate commerce of this country in 
many ways, not to mention the nation's basic political democracy.s6 
In addition to the proxy regulations, the federal government has 
already intruded directly into the state voting requirement in several 
other areas. For example, section 424c of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 makes shareholder approval a condition of a qualified stock 
option plan although not required by state law, and the Investment 
Company Act of 194087 directs that at any time less than a majority 
of directors of a registered investment company are elected by 
shareholders, a shareholder's meeting must promptly be held to 
fill vacancies on the board. A federal law of corporations is not 
being proposed,ss but the time has come for Congress to put a roof 
on the edifice it has long since erected. 
Institutional Stockholders 
Finally, we come to what has been perhaps the most cumbersome 
stumbling block to effective corporate democracy-the concentration of 
large blocks of funds in the hands of trusts, union pension funds, 
mutual funds and the like, which for the balance of this article shall be 
called institutions. However, two complementary suggestions, a pass-
through vote and a Committee on Shareholder Responsibility, present 
reasonable and practical solutions. 
Institutions whose portfolios are composed of relatively few stocks 
(five or less) could pass through the vote in these companies to their 
shareholders or other beneficial owners, comparable to the manner in 
which brokerage houses request instructions from beneficial owners on 
how to vote stock held in street name when there is a proxy fight.S9 
This approach might also be followed for any security in a portfolio 
which constitutes more than ten percent of the outstanding stock of 
SSNote 7, s-upra; and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n 
(1970). 
86A survey of 855 public corporations by The Conference Board, reported in 1973, 
showed that 273 companies ( 32%) had specifically provided for cumulative voting 
in their by-laws or certificates of incorporation or both. Almost two-thirds had 
done so in response to a legal requirement, but the remainder instituted the pro-
vision as a matter of choice. Bacon, note 16, supra, at 7. 
87Jnvestment Company Act of 1940 § 16a, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16a (1940) .. 
88But see Schwartz, The Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 8 Bus. 
~£ Soc. Rtv. 53 (1973-74). 
89Note 25, mpra. The New York Stock Exchange has for some time had an 
.nformal policy of requiring a company pension trust which has significant holdings 
of its own company's stock to solicit voting instructions from the beneficiaries of 
the trust. Cf. Restrictions on Voting Rights Through Voting Trusts or Similar 
Arrangements, NEw YoRK STOCK ExcBANG~ CoMPANY MANUAL§ AlS, at A-280. 
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any class of securities entitled to elect a director regardless of the 
number of different securities in its portfolio. Copies of the proxy 
material would be mailed to the stockholders or beneficial owners of 
the securities at the cost of the soliciting corporation.90 Voting would 
not be on an all or none basis but would be in a pro rata manner to 
reflect the instructions of the institutions' shareholders or other bene-
ficial owners based on their proportionate beneficial interest in the 
portfolio. These rules should not apply to investments in subsidiaries, 
but to investments by subsidiaries in outside corporations and should 
be consolidated with such investments by the parent corporation for 
these purposes. Investments of industrial companies or utilities as part 
of their normal business activities or investments of any institution in 
non-public companies should be exempt from such requirements. How-
ever, this procedure will become too cumbersome for institutions with a 
large portfolio of stocks, each representing a relatively small voting 
position. 
The second suggestion, applicable to all other situations, is the 
selection for each institution of a Committee on Shareholder Respon-
sibility which would have the authority to vote the stock held by the 
institution.91 The Committee would be charged with the duty of making 
a specific determination on how to vote the stock held by the institution 
in any contested election, and the institution would cast its vote in 
proportion to the vote of its Committee members. 
Since most institutions vote unfailingly for the management slate, 
evidencing disapproval by selling the security of the portfolio company 
rather than by attempting to sponsor or participate in movements for 
management reorganization,92 the separation of the voting decision from 
the investment decision is justified in practice, and moreover would be 
a decision and not merely a clerical act.93 The boards of directors 
90Cf, note 12, supra. 
91An interesting example of a comparable but more restricted committee in a 
noncommercial situation is the Advisory Committe on Shareholders Responsibility 
at Harvard University which studies proposals which will come before share-
holders' meetings of corporations in which Harvard owns stock and makes voting 
recommendations to the governing body of the university. 
92Wharton Study, note 37, supra. 
93Investors apparently are generally concerned with the social as well as eco-
nomic impact of the investments made by institutions in which they have an interest. 
A survey was conducted in 1971 by the Wellington Management Co. which 
then managed four mutual funds with assets of $3.5 billion. The survey showed 
that 82% of the stockholders agreed a fund should emphasize investments in socially 
responsible companies since such qualities tended to be indicative of management 
ability and responsiveness to changing trends in other areas, and 56% agreed that a 
fund should invest only in socially responsible companies even if other companies 
offered better investment opportunities. As noted in editorial comment following 
Doctors, Who Uses Social Criteria in Institutional Investing, 2 Bus. & Soc. REV. 
98 (1972). 
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historically have not actively made such choices, nor are they necessarily 
inclined to devote the required energy to what would become a time 
consuming task. They are interested in running their institutions, not 
making decisions on the management of other companies. 
There are several alternatives for selecting the Committee, including 
the election of the Committee by the shareholders at the annual share-
holder's meeting, selection of the Committee by the board, or by the 
outside directors on the board. A combination of these suggestions· 
might best achieve a broad representation with a maximum of expe-
dience. The Committee could be composed of the outside (non-man-
agement) directors plus any nominee for director who received at 
least ten percent of the votes necessary to elect him as a director (under 
cumulative voting) at the last annual meeting, but in no event should 
the Committee be larger than the board. The Committee should also be 
authorized to select an Advisory Group which could make recommen-
dations to the Committee. The members of the Advisory Group would 
not be employees of the institution and provisions would have to be 
incorporated in any legislation to assure that the Advisory Group would 
be independent, although they might be compensated. While admittedly 
the Committee vote is not a direct vote by the shareholders, it is likely 
to be reasonably reflective of their views. Concededly, this is not a 
perfect system, but it will compel a political and economic input by 
institutions, and the institutional vote will not necessarily be an auto-
matic vote for management. 94 
The implementation of these proposals would require amendments 
to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. Since the implementation of these proposals will be a new 
corporate experience, legislation should be broadly drafted, giving ex-
tensive regulatory authority to the Commission. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The present industrial and financial complex in America is composed 
principally of public corporations whose management is responsive in 
the normal course to itself alone, a situation perpetuated by the current 
complexion of federal and state law. The states have avoided the problem 
or left it to a Congress which since the 1934 Act has relied on the proxy 
rules alone to foster democracy in corporations. That solution was a 
vital first step. Forty years later it is clear that it is not enough. 
94A much less satisfactory but possible alternative would be to disenfranchise 
shares while held by institutions. 
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Despite the possible alternatives to democratic capitalism, it is sub-
mitted that the only realistic alternative to corporate democracy is 
socialism, possibly democratic, not impossibly a form of national social-
ism. As the economic operation of capitalism and communism converge, 
it becomes apparent that in the long view the principal difference be-
tween these systems may not be which can best deliver goods and 
services to the people but which system is most consistent with liberty. 
And liberty will only persist where the political system and the economic 
system which support it are both rooted in democratic principles. 
